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ABSTRACT 
The social saving literature has highlighted the indispensable role that railways played 
before 1914 in several Latin American export-oriented economies, such as Mexico, 
Brazil or Argentina. This paper analyses the case of Uruguay, a country that, by 1914, 
had built one of the densest railway networks in Latin America. The paper shows that, 
in contrast to what happened in other economies of the region, the resource saving 
effects of the Uruguayan railways during the first globalisation were tiny, due to the 
small share that railway output accounted for within GDP. Three complementary 
reasons are suggested to explain that result: the geographical structure of the country, its 
sectoral specialisation and the small scale of the Uruguayan economy. Due to these 
three characteristics, Uruguay was unable to benefit from railways in the way that other 
export-oriented Latin American economies did during the first period of globalisation. 
This conclusion draws attention to the geographic-specific character of railway 
technology. 
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1. Introduction 
The railways were an essential component of the transport revolution that made 
the first globalisation possible and had a huge growth impact in several Latin American 
export-oriented economies. In countries such as Argentina, Brazil or Mexico, the 
railways created and strengthened the links between previously fragmented local 
markets, and also between them and the world markets, having a much more 
developmental character in those countries than in the core economies, which already 
had relatively efficient and competitive market structures at the beginning of the railway 
era (Coatsworth, 1981; Summerhill, 2000 and 2003; Kuntz Ficker, 1999; Dobado and 
Marrero, 2005). Actually, in Summerhill’s words, “(…) it now seems unlikely that any 
other technological or institutional innovation was more important in the transition to 
economic growth in Latin America before 1930” (Summerhill, 2006: 297). 
Uruguay, like other Latin American economies that participated actively in the 
first globalisation era, also undertook an intense process of railway construction during 
the last few decades of the nineteenth century, and its railway network was one of the 
densest in the continent by 1913. However, assessments of the role that railways played 
on the transformation of the Uruguayan economy during the first globalisation boom 
have been rather pessimistic. Both contemporaries and subsequent historians have 
insisted that the Uruguayan railways were badly constructed and managed, did not 
respond to the country’s needs, and had no impact on either the diversification of 
production or the increase in the available stock of natural resources due, among other 
reasons, to the business strategy of the railway firms (see, e.g. García Acevedo, 1892, p. 
47; Vázquez, 1931; Nahum and Barrán, 1971, p. 535-613; Millot and Bertino, 1996, p. 
345; Winn, 2010, p. 251). 
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In this context, this paper aims at providing a global estimation of the direct 
impact of Uruguayan railways on economic growth before 1914 and providing some 
possible explanations for the low level of that impact and the apparent exceptionality of 
the Uruguayan economy in the Latin American context. To that purpose, the next 
section provides a short survey of the characteristics of the Uruguayan railway system 
during the first globalisation period; Section 3 presents an estimation of the social 
savings of the Uruguayan railway system by 1912-13; Section 4 analyses some of the 
potential explanatory factors of the social saving estimation outcomes; and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. The Uruguayan railway system (1869-1914) 
Railway construction in Uruguay started relatively late, compared with other 
leading Latin American economies such as Cuba (whose first railway line was opened 
in 1837) or Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru (where construction 
started in the 1850s). Due mostly to the enduring economic devastation provoked in the 
country by the Guerra Grande,2 there were no serious initiatives for railway 
construction until the mid 1860s, and the first railway stretch, of just 20 km, was only 
opened in 1869. However, despite that delay, by the eve of World War One Uruguay 
had built a railway system of 2,577 km, which was among the densest in the continent, 
both in per capita terms and relative to the country’s surface area. Compared with 
European networks, the per capita mileage of the Uruguayan railway system was more 
than twice the European average, although it ranked much lower in relation to the 
country’s area, due to the large difference in population density between Uruguay and 
Europe. 
 
                                                 
2
 The Uruguayan Civil War, also known as “Guerra Grande” (Great War), was a series of armed conflicts 
that took place between the two factions that disputed power in 19th century Uruguay (the “Colorado” 
and the National Parties) from 1839 to 1851. 
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Table 1. Railway network mileage in 1912. 
 Mileage/population 
(Railway km per 
10,000 pop.) 
 Mileage/surface area 
(Railway km per 
1,000 km2) 
Argentina 42.65 Puerto Rico 38.88 
Uruguay 21.78 Cuba 33.37 
Chile 21.20 Salvador 15.44 
Costa Rica 16.51 Uruguay 13.52 
Cuba 16.13 Costa Rica 11.95 
Mexico 14.22 Argentina 11.39 
Brazil 9.53 Mexico 10.37 
Peru 7.46 Chile 9.87 
Guatemala 7.08 Guatemala 7.43 
Bolivia 6.03 Dominican Republic 4.90 
Paraguay 5.83 Haiti 3.62 
Nicaragua 5.67 Brazil 2.76 
Ecuador 3.81 Nicaragua 2.49 
Venezuela 3.31 Paraguay 2.32 
Dominican Republic 3.14 Peru 2.31 
El Salvador 3.13 Ecuador 2.06 
Puerto Rico 3.05 Honduras 1.53 
Honduras 2.96 Colombia 1.03 
Colombia 2.09 Panama 1.01 
Panama 1.78 Bolivia 0.99 
Haiti 0.58 Venezuela 0.94 
Latin America 
(weighted average) 12.94 
Latin America 
(weighted average) 5.01 
US 26.65 US 25.69 
Europe (weighted 
average)a 10.07 
Europe (weighted 
average)a 61.53 
Sources: Own elaboration from Mitchell (2003a) and (2003b), Maddison (2001), and Banks’ CNTS 
Archive. 
Note: (a) In 1910; Russia excluded. 
 
As in other countries, the construction of Uruguayan railways was highly 
concentrated in a few years; 44 percent of the mileage in operation in 1913 was opened 
between 1885 and 1891. The structure of the railway network was extremely 
centralised, mainly consisting of a series of lines that connected the extreme points of 
the country with Montevideo (see Map 1).3 Unlike other neighbouring countries, which 
had a significant share of State railways, the whole network was privately owned by a 
few British companies. By 1913, 61 percent of the network mileage was operated by the 
Central Uruguay Railway Company, and 20 percent was in the hands of the Midland 
Uruguay Railway. The remaining 19 percent of the mileage was distributed among five 
very small companies, which operated networks ranging from 20 to 181 km. 
                                                 
3
 According to Millot and Bertino (1996), p. 352, this structure reproduced the pre-existing trade flows. 
An exception to centralisation was the “North Western of Uruguay Railway Company”, which connected 
Salto and Santa Rosa and was initially aimed at carrying Brazilian and Uruguayan products to the port of 
Salto, over the Uruguay River, to be shipped from there to their destination by water. However, this line 
was also finally connected with Montevideo through the Midland Uruguay Railway. 
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Map 1. The Uruguayan railway network by 1914 
 
Note: The thick solid lines indicate the railways constructed before 1904, and the broken 
lines show the railways constructed between 1904 and 1914. 
Source: Barrán and Nahum (1978), p. 129. 
 
The construction of the railway system accompanied the development of the 
modern Uruguayan economy. When the first railway line was opened, Uruguay was a 
small society with a population of ca. 400,000, of which almost one third lived in 
Montevideo, and which had no significant transport infrastructure (see Baracchini, 
1978: 130-45). The country was deeply transformed in the next few decades and, by the 
eve of World War One, the Uruguayan population had trebled, and exports and GDP 
were 4 and 5 times as large as in 1870, respectively. Figure 1 shows that the 
construction of the railway network ran parallel to that economic transformation, being 
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the main infrastructure investment and one of the main destinations of foreign capital 
during the period.4 
 
Figure 1. Railway mileage, GDP and exports in Uruguay (1870-1913) (1913=100) 
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Sources: railway mileage, own elaboration from the country’s statistical yearbooks; GDP from Bértola 
(1998), and exports from Bértola (2000), pp. 84-85. 
 
 Railway transport represented a growing share of Uruguayan GDP throughout 
the period under analysis, reaching a level of 2 to 2.5 percent of the country’s total 
output in the decade before World War One (see Figure 2). However, the ratio between 
railway revenues and GDP was much higher in Argentina, Brazil or Mexico by the 
same dates (between 3.5 and 6 approximately; see Herranz-Loncán, 2011). This may be 
taken as a first indication that the railways did not perform the same function in 
Uruguay as in those countries during the export-led growth episode of 1870-1913. The 
next section tests this hypothesis through the estimation of the direct economic benefits 
that the Uruguayan economy obtained from the railway system before 1914. 
 
                                                 
4
 Railways accounted for 32 percent of foreign investment in Uruguay during the period under study; see 
Rodríguez Carrasco (1998), p. 136. A Granger-causality analysis of the series included in Figure 1 shows 
a close Granger-causal relationship between the development of railway mileage and the growth of 
exports between 1870 and 1913, in both directions, which is consistent with the foreign origin of railway 
investment and the use of the railways by a large share of Uruguayan exports. By contrast, the Granger-
causality relationship between railway mileage and GDP is not significant. 
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Figure 2. Railway output/GDP in Uruguay (%) 
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Sources: i) for railway output, Uruguayan Statistical Yearbooks (1884-1915) and Yearly Reports of the 
Central Uruguay Railway Company, the Midland Uruguay Railway Company, the North Western of 
Uruguay Railway Company and the Sociedad del Ferrocarril y Tranvía del Norte; ii) nominal GDP is 
calculated on the basis of its level in 1955 and its previous evolution, as estimated by Bertino and Tajam 
(1999) and Bértola (1998). 
Note: i) Gaps of revenue information for some of the smallest companies in some years (e.g. North 
Western in 1874-82 and 1904-08, Uruguayo del Este in 1892-1908, Uruguay Northern in 1904-07 or 
Ferrocarril y Tranvía del Norte before 1889) are filled by assuming a similar ratio of revenues per km 
between those companies and the Central Uruguay Railway as in the closest years for which complete 
data are available. ii) In the case of the railway of Puerto del Sauce (42 km), which was opened to traffic 
in 1903, no revenue or expenditure data are available. Therefore, in order to account for its traffic, I have 
increased the total revenues of the system by the percentage that this line represented in the whole 
network mileage (around 1.9 percent on average). 
 
 
3. The social saving of the Uruguayan railways by 1912-13 
The estimation of social savings constitutes a preliminary way to approach the 
direct economic benefits that the economy obtained from the railways. The social 
savings are intended to measure the resources released by the railway technology in 
transport activities. This is achieved by calculating the cost of transporting the railway 
freight and passengers of one year by the best available alternative. Social savings are 
therefore the result of estimating the following expression: 
SS = (PALT – PRW) x QRW        (1) 
where PRW and PALT are, respectively, the price of railway and counterfactual 
(alternative) transport, and QRW is the freight and passengers transported by the railways 
in the reference year. This is usually expressed in relative terms, as a percentage of 
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GDP. If this expression is corrected to account for the price-elasticity of transport 
demand, the result would be the equivalent variation consumer surplus provided by the 
railways which, if perfect competition in the rest of the economy is assumed, provides a 
general equilibrium measure of the entire direct real income gain obtained from 
reducing resource costs in transportation (Metzer, 1984). 
The level of this gain depends therefore on three magnitudes: the relative size of 
the railway sector (QRW / GDP), the unit savings in transport cost provided by the 
railways (PALT – PRW) and the price elasticity of transport demand in each country. In the 
next paragraphs, I provide estimates of these three magnitudes and the direct income 
gain resulting from them for both freight and passenger transport in Uruguay in 1912-
13.5 
3.1. Freight social savings 
In 1912-13 the Uruguayan railway system transported 305.8 million ton-km, and 
charged an average fee of 0.016 pesos per ton-km.6 In the absence of the railways, that 
freight would have been moved through a combination of river navigation and road 
transport. Opposite to the situation in other Latin American countries, like Mexico or 
Brazil, the geography of Uruguay offered a huge potential for water transport use, since 
a large part of the contour of the country is surrounded by the river Uruguay and the La 
Plata estuary, where water transport was highly developed before the arrival of the 
railways, and some railway lines, such as the Ferrocarril Uruguayo del Este 
(Montevideo-Maldonado), the Colonia branch of the Central Uruguay Railways or the 
route between Paysandú and Salto, ran parallel and very close to the riverbanks. 
Nevertheless, river navigation was not a feasible alternative for traffic coming from the 
North or Northeast of the country, or from areas bordering the Uruguay River upstream 
from Salto, due to the presence of waterfalls. In the absence of the railways, that traffic 
would have been transported by road, which was much more expensive than railways or 
navigation. 
                                                 
5
 As in similar research for other countries I exclude from the analysis some sorts of traffic, like high-
speed freight or excess luggage which, according to the 1913-14 Uruguayan Statistical Yearbook, 
accounted for ca. 5 percent of the total revenues of the Uruguayan railways in 1912-13. 
6
 Figures estimated from information in the country’s Statistical Yearbook. There are no data available on 
the freight transported by the Sociedad del Ferrocarril y Tranvía del Norte (20 km) and the railway of 
Puerto del Sauce (42 km). For the former, I estimate freight to be 1.8 percent of the freight of all other 
companies, on the basis of revenue data, and under the assumption that this railway charged the average 
rate of the system. For the latter, given the lack of revenue data, I increase total railway freight by 1.6 
percent, which was the share of this company within total railway mileage in 1912-13.  
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There is some information available on the rates charged by river and road 
carriers during the period under study. Although, as is usual in this kind of exercise, this 
information could hardly pass the standard tests applied to representative samples of 
data (O’Brien, 1977: 113), it allows calculating preliminary estimates of the unit cost 
savings provided by the railway technology. For river navigation, Mourat (1973: 88) 
reports that the average price of freight transport by river between Montevideo and 
Salto or Concordia (both at a similar distance from Montevideo on either side of the 
Uruguay river) was 2.5 pesos per ton in 1913, i.e. 0.0040 pesos per ton-km (or 0.0042 
pesos if it is considered, in the context of the social saving calculation, that the distance 
between Montevideo and Salto was 6 percent longer by river than by railway). 
According to Mourat (1977: 43) those prices had remained quite stable in nominal terms 
at least since 1899. In addition, Nahum and Barrán (1971: 626-27) indicate that the 
transport of 100 kg of wheat from Colonia to Montevideo cost 0.2 pesos ca. 1900, i.e. 
0.0111 pesos per ton-km. If this figure is corrected for the evolution of prices in the first 
years of the 20th century and for the fact that the distance between those cities was 37 
percent longer via rail than by boat, the resulting counterfactual rate per ton-km would 
be 0.0116 pesos.7 As might be expected, those two alternative rates (0.0042 and 0.0116 
pesos per ton-km) were significantly lower than the average railway freight transport fee 
(0.016), which clearly indicates that the advantages of the railways over water transport 
cannot be ascribed to price but to other factors such as speed and regularity. These, 
however, were often insufficient for the railways to attract water traffic, except through 
the application of differential rates.8 
Those two rates might be taken as upper and lower bounds for navigation prices 
in the social saving estimation, and their average is very close to the counterfactual 
water transport rate suggested by Summerhill for Argentina (the equivalent of 0.0074 
Uruguayan pesos for traffic through the Paraná River). The difference between them 
would reflect the fact that the unit cost of water freight transport decreases with 
distance, and it was therefore lower on the Montevideo-Salto route (626 km) than on the 
Montevideo-Colonia route (180 km). 
                                                 
7
 All price adjustments are based in the evolution of the GDP deflator estimated by Bértola (1998). 
8
 For instance, after the connection of the Central Uruguay Railway network with the North Western 
Company through the Midland, the latter started charging lower rates to traffic coming from the ports of 
the Uruguay River; see Martínez Montero (1955), pp. 402-403. 
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In the case of overland transport, the railways provided a substantial cost 
decrease over both carting transport and livestock droving. Starting with the former, the 
successive volumes of the Historia rural del Uruguay moderno by Barrán and Nahum 
report several rates charged by carting carriers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
which illustrate the cost advantage of the railways. They are summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2. Carting prices in Uruguay (1879-1906) 
Source Year Route Freight 
transported 
Price in 
current 
pesos 
Price per ton-
km in pesos 
of 1912-13 
Acevedo, E., Anales 
Históricos, t. IV, p. 50 1879 
Durazno-
Montevideo 
(205 km) 
3 tons of first-
class freight 16 0.0313 
Acevedo, E., Anales 
Históricos, t. IV, p. 50 1879 
Durazno-
Montevideo 
(205 km) 
160 arrobas of 
second-class 
freight 
16 0.0511 
Acevedo, E., Anales 
Históricos, t. IV, p. 50 1879 
Durazno-
Montevideo 
(205 km) 
192 arrobas of 
third-class 
freight 
16 0.0426 
Letter of Santa Rosa 
businessmen to the 
Central Uruguay Railway 
1892 
Santa Rosa-
Montevideo 
(54.3 km) 
1,760 kg of grain 4.28 0.0739 
Letter of Santa Rosa 
businessmen to the 
Central Uruguay Railway 
1892 
Santa Rosa-
Montevideo 
(54.3 km) 
1,800 kg of 
general freight 4.50 0.0759 
El Conciliador, 
Maldonado 1896 
Maldonado-
Montevideo 
(114 km) 
One cart 6.50 0.0559 
El Siglo 1906 Melo-Nico Pérez (191 km) 2,000 kg 20 0.0621 
El Siglo 1913 
From an 
unidentified 
colony to Melo 
(30 km) 
100 kg 0.30 to 0.50 
0.100 to 
0.1667 
Sources: Barrán and Nahum (1967), p. 292 and 619; (1973), p. 448; and (1978), pp. 159-160. For the 
1896 data, I assume that one cart carried 1.75 tons, following Millot and Bertino (1996), p. 319. To obtain 
the figures in the last column I have used the GDP deflator estimated by Bértola (1998). 
 
A potential problem of these figures is that, with the exception of the 
observations in the last two rows, all the rest come from documents aimed at criticising 
the high level of the railway rates compared with carting prices, rather than from 
objective reports. However, other available evidence suggests that they might be 
representative of the actual rates. For instance, the 1882 Yearly Report of the Central 
Uruguay Railway indicated that the transport of a cartload between Yi and Tacuarembó 
(a route of 240 km with no railway alternative yet) was charged 4 pounds, i.e. 0.0555 
pesos of 1912-13 per ton-km, which lies within the range of the figures in the table. 
And, in the case of Argentina, Summerhill (2000, p. 10) estimated the unit cost of road 
transport between Córdoba and Rosario (346 km) as 0.083 gold pesos per ton-km in the 
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early 1860s, whereas Cortés Conde (1979, p. 187) reported a carting price of 0.075 gold 
pesos per ton-km in 1883. These rates would be equivalent to 0.0774 and 0.0699 
Uruguayan pesos, which are also of a similar order of magnitude to the figures in the 
table. 
In addition, as happened in the case of river navigation, differences among the 
rates reported in Table 2 seem to be directly related to differences among travel 
distances. Actually, they fit rather well to a log cost function of distance, as may be seen 
in Figure 3, which also includes the rate provided by the 1882 Yearly Report of the 
Central Uruguay Railway. If this function is applied to the average distance travelled by 
freight through the Uruguayan railway network in 1912-1913 (162.82 km),9 the 
resulting rate is 0.0564 pesos per ton-km, i.e. 3.6 times the average railway fare. 
 
Figure 3. Carting transport unit cost in Uruguay 
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As for livestock, here I assume that, in the absence of the railways, it would have 
been transported by droving. Nahum and Barrán (1971, p. 612) also provide some data 
on the price of cattle droving per head on several routes (Rivera-Montevideo, 
Tambores-Montevideo and Río Negro-Casupá) by 1889-92. These prices may be 
                                                 
9
 Figure calculated from the 1912-13 Uruguayan Statistical Yearbook (I exclude livestock transport to 
make the calculation; see below). 
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transformed into pesos of 1912-13 per ton-km by applying the average weight of cattle 
slaughtered in Montevideo in 1913 (270 kg).10 The resulting rates range from 0.0093 to 
0.0163, and decrease with distance. This allows one to estimate by means of a log cost 
function the rate corresponding to the average distance of railway livestock transport in 
1912-13 (205.8 km). The outcome of this calculation is 0.0140 pesos per ton-km, i.e. a 
very similar rate to the average railway fare. This would imply that, as in the case of 
water navigation, there were no direct cost savings in railway livestock transport. 
However, this estimation ignores the loss of weight of livestock during their journey, 
which was much lower if the travel was made by railway. This issue gained relevance in 
the early 20th century, when meat processing plants replaced salting houses as the main 
destination for a large share of the livestock transported and the unit value of cattle 
increased substantially as a result of crossbreeding (Martínez Díaz, 1987, p. 56; 
Rodríguez Carrasco, p. 144; Barrán and Nahum, 1973, pp. 442-3).11 
Here I assume that livestock lost on average 15 percent of its weight and market 
value in a droving journey, and just 5 percent on an average railway journey. These are 
very tentative percentages based on some scattered evidence for cattle transport coming 
from Uruguay and other countries.12 If I use the price of cattle and sheep meat in the 
Montevideo wholesale markets in 1913 to value the differential loss associated with 
droving, and apply the result to the weight of animals moved by the railways in 1912-
13, the resulting cost difference would amount to 5.74 million pesos, and the total 
(direct plus indirect) cost of droving per ton-km would be 0.114 pesos, i.e. 
approximately seven times as high as the average railway rate.13 
                                                 
10
 Figure taken from the country’s Statistical Yearbook. 
11
 By contrast, weight loss was not a serious problem in the case of livestock used for dried beef 
production during the 19th century. This was clearly stated in the 1880 Central Uruguay Railway Yearly 
Report: “Our present limited wagon stock only admits of our bringing in lots of 150 to 200 head at a time, 
such small troops being for consumption in the city of Monte Video, while the larger troops of from 500 
to 1,000 head for Saladero purposes are usually driven from up country all the way into town” (p. 7). The 
replacement of droving by the railways arrived quite rapidly between 1896 and 1905; whereas in the 
former year only 16 percent of the cattle transported to Montevideo was carried there by railways, that 
figure was 68 percent nine years later (Central Uruguay Railway, Report of the Directors to the 
Proprietors for the Half-Year Ended 31th December, 1905, p. 23). 
12
 The 5 percent ratio for railway transport comes from a study for Germany, which was reproduced in 
Revista de la Asociación Rural del Uruguay, XLII, 5 (1913), pp. 352-353, and the 15 percent ratio for 
droving has been deduced from average weight losses in 19th century cattle droving in Britain, as reported 
by Colyer (1972) and Palmer (2002), p. 29. The 10 percentage point difference between both transport 
systems is consistent with a comparison reported in Revista de la Asociación Rural del Uruguay, XXXV, 
4 (1906), p. 105, according to which a shipment of cattle transported to Montevideo by train was sold at a 
unit price 5.50 pesos higher than a similar shipment carried by droving. 
13
 Cattle and sheep price and weight data in 1913 have been taken from the 1913-14 Uruguayan Statistical 
Yearbook. 
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In addition to rate estimates, the calculation of the social savings of the 
Uruguayan railways requires making some assumptions on the percentages of railway 
freight that would have been transported by boats, carts and droving in the absence of 
railways. I consider, first, that all livestock railway transport (i.e. 18.8 of all railway 
freight), would have been moved by droving in the counterfactual economy, since 
domestic water transport of livestock was not developed in Uruguay during the period 
under study.14 Therefore, in the absence of the railways, I assume that 57.26 million 
ton-km would have been moved by droving, and would have been charged a unit (direct 
plus indirect) cost of 0.114 pesos per ton-km. 
The remaining freight would have been distributed between ships and carts. 
Given the large difference between the rates of those two transport modes (0.004/0.012 
vs. 0.056), assumptions on this issue have a considerable influence on the social saving 
estimation results. As has been indicated above, a significant share of the Uruguayan 
railway network ran very close to the Uruguay River and the La Plata estuary. In order 
to carry out the estimation, I have assumed that, in the counterfactual economy, boats 
would have transported all the freight (apart from livestock) moved among stations that 
were at a distance of 25 km or less from the Uruguay or La Plata riverbanks, including 
stations in the Montevideo area.15 
Unfortunately, detailed information on traffic between stations is lacking for the 
year of reference. The Uruguayan Statistical Yearbook (1912-13) provides instead the 
total tons shipped from each station during the year, without indication of distance 
travelled or destination. Excluding livestock from the calculation, freight shipped from 
the stations that were closest to the rivers (apart from Montevideo) amounted to 20.2 
percent of all tons moved by the railways. If this amount is increased by 20.2 percent of 
the freight sent from the Montevideo area to the rest of the country (under the 
assumption that traffic from Montevideo was distributed among different destinations 
according to the importance of each station in the total shipment of freight), this would 
                                                 
14
 See, for instance, Martínez Montero (1955), p. 403. I exclude pigs from livestock transport. They 
represented 1.5 percent of the total number of live animals moved by the railways and ca. 1.2 percent of 
livestock transport revenues. The second percentage is based on the average weights of different animals 
sold in Montevideo in 1913, which has been taken from the country’s Statistical Yearbook. 
15
 These would include, apart from the Montevideo stations, the whole line of the Ferrocarril Uruguayo 
del Este, the stations between Colonia Suiza and Puerto del Sauce/Colonia in the Central Uruguay 
Railway, those between Porvenir and Salto and between Bellaco and Fray Bentos in the Midland Uruguay 
Railway, and Salto and San Antonio in the North Western Railway. I do not consider here the traffic of 
the company of Puerto del Sauce due to lack of data. 
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mean that 25.6 percent of all tons transported by the Uruguayan railways (livestock 
excluded) were shipped or received in stations where water transport was a feasible 
alternative. I therefore use this percentage as the share of non-livestock freight output 
that would be moved by boat in the counterfactual economy, and consider that all the 
rest would be transported by carts.16 The rate applied to cart transport is, as has been 
indicated, 0.0564 pesos per ton-km, and the counterfactual water transport rate is a 
weighted average of the two figures for long and short-distance travels (0.0042 and 
0.0116 pesos per ton-km), where weights are the estimated shares of traffic from and to 
North Western ports, and from and to ports in La Plata, respectively.17 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of the social saving of railway 
freight transport in Uruguay in 1912-13, which accounted for a very small percentage of 
the country’s GDP, compared with other Latin American countries, such as Mexico, 
Brazil or Argentina, where the ratio between the freight social savings and GDP was 
similar or higher than 20 percent. These results are therefore consistent with the 
hypothesis that the Uruguayan railways had a relatively low economic impact.18 
                                                 
16
 I assume therefore that transport flows ran mainly to and from Montevideo. I also assume that no live 
animals were shipped from the Montevideo area to the rest of the country.  
17
 In order to estimate that average, I assume that traffic from the North West traveled a distance that was 
three times as large as that travelled by traffic from the South, on the basis of the relative average distance 
between those ports and Montevideo. 
18
 Annex 1 presents a sensitivity analysis that reports the effects of the potential biases introduced in the 
social saving estimation by some of the assumptions made on the Uruguayan counterfactual economy, 
both for freight and passenger transport. 
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Table 3. The social saving of Uruguayan railway freight transport (1912-13) 
1. Railway economy  
a) Railway freight (million ton-km) 305.81 
b) Railway market fare (pesos per ton-km) 0.016 
c) Railway freight revenues (million pesos) (a x b) 4.742 
2. Counterfactual economy  
c) Water transport freight (million ton-km) 63.63 
d) Water transport rate (pesos per ton-km) 0.0061 
e) Water transport cost (million pesos) (c x d) 0.389 
f) Carting transport freight (million ton-km) 184.92 
g) Carting transport rate (pesos per ton-km) 0.0564 
h) Carting transport cost (million pesos) (f x g) 10.424 
i) Droving output (million ton-km) 57.26 
j) Droving unit cost (pesos per ton-km) 0.114 
k) Droving total cost (million pesos) (i x j) 6.525 
Social saving (million pesos) (e + h + k –c) 12.613 
As a % of GDP 3.83 
Sources: See text and, for nominal GDP, see sources to Figure 2. 
 
Those figures should be increased by the indirect costs of alternative transport 
means, which ranged from their lower safety and regularity to the need of holding 
higher stocks of circulating capital in order to overcome the longer duration of carting 
or navigation journeys.19 There were also some indirect differential costs of railway 
transport, such as the need for trans-shipping and the fact that carting transport had a 
very low opportunity cost in areas with high seasonality of agrarian work.20 However, 
as in estimates for other countries (Coatsworth, 1981; Summerhill, 2003), here these 
aspects have been kept apart due to the difficulty of their estimation. 
3.2. Passenger social savings 
In 1912-13 the passenger output of the Uruguayan railways amounted to 115.39 
million passenger-km, which were charged an average rate of 0.018 pesos. The 
                                                 
19
 Uruguayan railway managers were well aware of the importance of these indirect benefits; for instance, 
the 1876 Yearly Report of the Central Uruguay Railway mentioned the advantage of holding lower 
capital stock, which was enjoyed by those merchants that used the railways (p. 12). See also “Necesidad 
del ferrocarril”, Revista de la Asociación Rural del Uruguay, XXIII, 8 (1894), pp. 203-204, which 
stresses the importance of the higher uncertainty involved in road transport. 
20
 On the problem of the presence of idle resources for the estimation of social savings see, for instance, 
Toniolo (1983); for Uruguay, see also Nahum and Barrán (1971), p. 623. This issue was also considered 
at the time; the 1876 Yearly Report of the Central Uruguay Railway, for instance, indicated that many 
farmers (especially those closer to Montevideo) had their own carts and bullocks and could devote some 
of their idle time to transport activities (Central Uruguay Railway, Report and Accounts for the Year 
1877, p. 4; see also García Acevedo, 1892, p. 4). 
16 
 
alternative transport means available to those passengers were river navigation, 
stagecoach transport, and mounted travel or walking. Railways provided travellers with 
substantial time savings compared with all those modes. The speed of Uruguayan 
passenger railways was around 34.4 km p/h in 1913, whereas river navigation and 
stagecoach speed might be estimated as 12 and 6.5 km p/h, respectively. As for the 
average speed of foot travel, it might be assumed to be around 3 km p/h.21 By contrast, 
rate savings were only relevant in comparison with stagecoach transport. Although 
information on passenger water transport rates is not abundant, they might be estimated 
as ca. 0.0048 pesos per passenger-km, on the basis of the available data on prices of the 
travel from Montevideo to Buenos Aires, i.e. less than one third of the railway average 
fare.22 The fare of stagecoach transport would have been instead around 0.0614 pesos 
per passenger-km,23 or more than three times the railway rate. 
When analysing the social savings of railway passenger transport in Mexico or 
Brazil, both Coatsworth (1981) and Summerhill (2003) make a clear-cut difference 
between first and second class transport, under the assumption that those two services 
were used by different social classes with different transport demand functions. First 
class passengers would have been among the wealthiest classes of society and, for them, 
the alternative for the railways would have been the stagecoach. By contrast, second 
class passenger would have resorted to mounted transport or walking in the absence of 
the railroads, because stagecoach rates would have been prohibitive for them. However, 
it is not clear that such a procedure is adequate for Uruguay, for two reasons. First, in 
Uruguay, water transport would have been a cheap alternative for second class 
passenger on many transport routes. But, second and more important, the difference 
between first and second class fares in Uruguay and, subsequently, between the users of 
those two classes, was too small as to justify a separate treatment. More concretely, in 
Uruguay the second class average fare was 81 percent of the first class one, whereas in 
Argentina it was 67 percent, in Brazil 57 percent, and in Chile and Mexico 38 percent 
                                                 
21
 Railway speed calculated on the basis of the timetable of a sample of 59 passenger trains of different 
routes, taken from Ferrocarril Central del Uruguay (1913). Passenger water transport speed was around 
12 km p/h in the travel between Buenos Aires and Rosario after the adoption of steam, according to 
Zalduendo (1977), p. 53. This speed is consistent with Zaefferer de Goeneche (1987), p. 176. Stagecoach 
speed is calculated from information for several Uruguayan routes in Nahum and Barrán (1971), p. 624; I 
have based the estimation on the speed of the shortest trips reported, because the average distance of haul 
in passenger railway transport was just 60 km in 192-13. Walking speed is taken from Summerhill 
(2005), p. 85. 
22
 Information in Zaefferer de Goeneche (1987), p. 202. I correct the rate to take into account the 
difference in travel distance between the Uruguayan ports and Montevideo by river and by train. 
23
 Estimated from Nahum and Barrán (1971), p. 624. 
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(see Herranz-Loncán, 2011). As a consequence of the similarity of the rates of both 
classes, and unlike what was usual in most railway systems, in Uruguay passenger 
transport output was lower in the second than in the first class. In that context, and due 
to the absence of a cheap railway passenger service, the total number of passenger 
transported was much lower in Uruguay than in other countries with a comparable level 
of income per capita, such as Chile or Argentina.24 
Therefore, I assume here that there were no significant differences in Uruguay 
between the transport demand of the users of the first and second class railway services. 
Table 6 provides an estimate of the social savings of passenger transport, under the 
assumption that, in the absence of railways, all passengers would have travelled by 
either stagecoach or ship to their destination. The distribution of passengers among 
those two transport modes in the counterfactual economy is estimated in the same way 
as in the case of freight.25 Table 6 also includes an estimation of the time savings 
provided by the railways, under the assumption that railway passengers were among the 
wealthiest groups of society, and their working time was twice as valuable as that of 
skilled industrial workers.26 As in the case of freight, other indirect savings are 
excluded, such as those associated with the higher safety, comfort, regularity and 
predictability of the railways, or the increasing travel costs associated with meals during 
stagecoach travels (see e.g. García Acevedo, 1892, pp. 31-33). 
                                                 
24
 Whereas in Argentina and Chile the passengers transported by the railways in 1912/1913 amounted to 
11 and 5 times the total population of the country, respectively, in Uruguay that ratio was 1.5. Differences 
were less marked with Brazil or Mexico, where that ratio was 2.2 and 1.2 respectively. However, income 
per capita in those two countries was significantly lower than in Uruguay. 
25
 More precisely, I measure the percentage of total passengers that took the train in stations close to the 
riverbanks, except for Montevideo, and consider that twice that percentage (to account for return 
journeys) of the total passengers would have used ships in the counterfactual economy. The resulting 
share is 17 percent. 
26
 Wage data for skilled workers in Montevideo in 1913 have been kindly provided by Luis Bértola. I 
assume a working day of 8.5 hours and consider, as in Coatsworth (1981) or Summerhill (2003) that only 
about half the time savings were savings in working time and must therefore be included in the estimation 
of the additional consumer surplus. 
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Table 4. The social savings of railway passenger transport in Uruguay (1912-13). 
1. Railway economy  
a) Railway passenger transport (million passenger-km) 115.39 
b) Railway rate in pesos per passenger-km 0.018 
c) Railway passenger revenues (million pesos) (a x b) 2.034 
d) Unit value of working travel time in pesos per hour 0.409 
e) Working travel time by railway (million hours) (50 percent of a at 34.4 km p/h) 1.677 
f) Value of the working travel time by railway (million pesos) (d x e) 0.686 
2. Counterfactual economy  
g) Counterfactual water passenger transport (million passenger-km) 19.11 
h) Counterfactual water transport rate in pesos per passenger-km 0.0048 
i) Counterfactual water passenger transport cost (million pesos) (g x h) 0.0922 
j) Working travel time by water transport (million hours) (50 percent of g at 12 km p/h) 0.0038 
k) Value of the working travel time by water transport (million pesos) (d x j) 0.0016 
l) Counterfactual road passenger transport (million passenger-km) 96.27 
m) Counterfactual road transport rate in pesos per passenger-km 0.0614 
n) Counterfactual road passenger transport cost (million pesos) (l x m) 5.915 
o) Working travel time by road transport (million hours) (50 percent of l at 6.5 km p/h) 7.406 
p) Value of the working travel time by road transport (million pesos) (d x o) 3.029 
q) Savings on transport costs (million pesos) (i + n – c) 3.973 
r) Savings on travel time (million pesos) (k + p – f) 2.345 
s) Total savings (million pesos) (q + r) 6.318 
w) As a percentage of GDP 1.92 
Sources: see text and, for nominal GDP, see sources to Figure 2. 
 
As in other Latin American countries, in Uruguay passenger transport savings 
appear to have been rather small. However, in contrast to Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, 
they had a sizeable magnitude relative to the social savings of freight transport, due to 
the low level of the latter. 
3.3 Correction for the price elasticity of demand. 
In order to obtain figures of additional consumer surplus, the social saving 
estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4 must be corrected to account for the elasticity of 
transport demand. I have estimated the following transport demand function for freight 
and passenger transport in the Central Uruguay Railway Company network which, as 
has been indicated, represented 61 percent of the country’s mileage of track, between 
1892 and 1913: 
lnQ = α + β1lnP + β2lnGDP + β3lnN + β4 time    (2), 
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where Q is railway freight/passenger transport, P is the average market price of 
railway transport (expressed in constant pesos of 1913) and N is the Central Company 
mileage in operation. The series included in the transport demand function have been 
subjected to the ADF unit root test in order to know their level of integration. The 
results of the test are shown in Table 4, and all series appear to be integrated of order 
one. The number of lags has been determined through the Schwartz criterion, and the 
test includes a trend and/or a constant when these are significant. 
Table 5. Transport demand function. Unit root tests. 
(H0: presence of a unit root) 
Variable nº of lags trend/constant DW ADF t-stat 
lnQfreight 2 t, c 2.04 -2.48 
lnQpass. 0 t, c 1.98 -2.91 
lnPfreight 2 none 1.91 -1.19 
lnPpass. 0 t, c 1.71 -2.24 
lnGDP 0 t, c 1.91 -2.30 
lnN 0 none 1.83 1.30 
Sources: own elaboration on the basis of information on output, rates and mileage of the Central Uruguay 
Railway, taken from the company’s yearly reports, and GDP, from Bértola (1998). Railway rates have 
been expressed in pesos of 1913 using the deflator provided by Bértola (1998). 
 
The results of the OLS estimation of function (2) for both freight and passenger 
transport are displayed in Table 5. The estimation output may be considered as the error 
correction vector of a cointegration model, since the residuals of the equation appear to 
be stationary. As might be expected, the estimate of price elasticity is significantly 
smaller in the case of freight (-0.77) than in the case of passenger transport (-1.06), and 
both are in line with figures for other countries. 
Table 6. Uruguayan railway transport demand function (1891-1913) 
 Freight Passengers 
N 22 22 
Adj R2 0.97 0.99 
α 
-42.31 
(33.27) 
1.31 
(19.06) 
β1 -0.77* 
(0.27) 
-1.06** 
(0.17) 
β2 0.66* 
(0.28) 
0.83** 
(0.17) 
β3 0.25 
(0.12) 
0.30** 
(0.07) 
β4 0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.0003 
(0.011) 
ADF (residuals) 
-4.32** -3.67** 
* significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level; standard errors in brackets 
Sources: see Table 5. 
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According to these estimates, the additional consumer surplus provided by 
railway freight transport in Uruguay was 7.179 million pesos in 1912-13, i.e. 57 percent 
of the social saving estimate in Table 3, and just 2.18 percent of the country’s GDP. In 
the case of passengers, the additional consumer surplus was 3.151 million pesos, i.e. 60 
percent of the social saving estimate in Table 4 and 0.96 percent of GDP. The sum of 
both amounts is 10.330 million pesos, or 3.1 percent of GDP, which is very small 
compared with the available estimates for other countries (9 to 14 percent of GDP in the 
case of Brazil, Mexico and Argentina; see Herranz-Loncán, 2011). The potential 
reasons for this low level are explored in Section 4.  
 
4. Why was the impact of the Uruguayan railways so low? 
A comparison with Argentina, a neighbouring country with a relatively similar 
economic evolution during the period under study and a comparable level of income per 
capita, may help to explain why the resource saving impact of the Uruguayan railways 
was so low. The social savings of the Argentinean railways, under the assumption of 
inelastic demand, can be estimated as 19.9 percent of GDP in the case of freight and 1.7 
percent in the case of passengers (Herranz-Loncán, 2011). Passenger transport savings 
were very similar among both countries and, as in the case of Brazil and Mexico, they 
accounted for a rather tiny share of GDP. By contrast, freight social savings in 
Argentina were more than 5 times as high as in Uruguay, in relative terms. Apparently, 
resource savings in freight railway transport had a huge influence on the growth of the 
Argentinean economy, but rather discrete effects on the economic evolution of 
Uruguay. 
The reasons for the different level of the economic benefits of railway freight 
transport in the two countries may be better understood if the ratio between the 
(uncorrected) social savings and GDP is decomposed as: 
SS / GDP = (PALT – PRW) x QRW / GDP = 
= [(PRW x QRW) / GDP] x [(PALT  / PRW )– 1]    (3) 
The first term is the ratio between railway freight revenues and GDP, and 
depends on both the amount of freight moved and the level of railway rates. The second 
term, in turn, depends on the distance between railway and alternative transport rates. 
Table 7 provides the level of those two terms in Argentina and Uruguay in 1912-13, as 
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well as the average rate of railways and alternative transport means in both countries, 
expressed in a common currency (pounds sterling). 
Table 7. The components of freight social savings in Argentina and Uruguay in 
1912-13 
 (PRW x QRW) / GDP 
(%) 
(PALT  / PRW) – 1 PALT 
(pounds per ton-km) 
PRW 
(pounds per ton-km) 
Argentina 3.63 5.48 0.0130 0.0020 
Uruguay 1.44 2.65 0.0121 0.0033 
Sources: For Argentina, Herranz-Loncán (2011); for Uruguay, see text. 
 
According to the table, Argentina enjoyed a clear advantage over Uruguay both 
in the size of the railway sector and in the difference between railway rates and the 
prices of alternative transport means. The latter, in turn, was affected both by the lower 
level of alternative transport prices and by the higher level of railway rates in Uruguay. 
Differences among alternative transport prices in those two countries are, however, 
hardly significant. Actually, almost 95 percent of the difference between the countries’ 
social saving estimates can be explained by the fact that the railway sector was smaller 
and the railway rates higher in Uruguay. And, to a large extent, both factors might be 
reduced to a single one, since the most plausible reason for the high level of the 
Uruguayan rates was the low amount of freight transported by rail, which prevented 
from achieving scale economies in the sector. This is illustrated by Table 8, which 
provides the estimation results of a simplified cost function of the Uruguayan and 
Argentinean railway companies by 1912-13. As the coefficients of both freight and 
passenger transport indicate, average variable cost per ton-km or passenger-km tended 
to decrease with output growth. 
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Table 8. Variable cost function of the railway companies in Argentina and 
Uruguay (1912-13) 
Constant -6.757** 
(0.486) 
log ton-km 0.303** 
(0.099) 
log passenger-km 0.241** 
(0.067) 
log mileage 0.476** 
(0.118) 
dummy Uruguay 0.162 
(0.103) 
n 22 
Adj. R2 0.99 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the yearly operating costs, expressed in a common currency 
(pounds sterling). 
** Significant at the 1 percent level; standard errors in brackets. 
Sources: for Uruguay, the country’s statistical yearbook for 1912-13; for Argentina, Estadística de los 
Ferrocarriles en Explotación (1913). 
Note: The Argentinean Ferrocarril Transandino (a clear outlier) has been excluded from the estimation. 
 
On the basis of that estimation, Figure 4 presents the adjusted relationship 
between average variable cost per ton-km and the size of freight output, keeping 
constant passenger output and network mileage. The figure clearly shows that the 
Uruguayan railway companies were situated in the most unfavourable section of the 
cost function. The problem, besides, was not associated to the fragmentation of the 
network in different companies but to the scale of the sector in each country, since the 
whole Uruguayan railway freight output (306 million ton-km) was just 15 percent of the 
output of the largest Argentinean company (the Ferrocarril Central Argentino). 
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Figure 4. Fitted relationship between freight output and average variable cost in 
the Argentinean and Uruguayan railway companies in 1912-13 
 
Sources and notes: See Table 8. The graph depicts the relationship between average variable cost per ton-
km and freight output that results from the cost function estimation in Table 8, after keeping constant all 
other variables at their average level. The Uruguayan companies are identified by an U. 
 
 
Under these circumstances, the Uruguayan companies necessarily had to make 
up for the negative cost effects of low output by increasing rates. In other words, despite  
contemporaries demanding state regulation and fiercely criticising the high prices 
charged by the British-owned railways,27 there might actually have been relatively little 
margin for convergence of the Uruguayan railway rates with the Argentinean ones. This 
may be seen in Figure 5, which shows the relationship between freight and the unit rates 
applied by each company in Argentina and Uruguay by 1912-13. 
 
                                                 
27
 Criticisms to the high level of the Uruguayan railway rates are ubiquitous, both in the contemporary 
literature and in the historiography; see, for instance, García Acevedo (1892), pp. 207-11; Vázquez 
(1931); Acevedo (1934), pp. 50, 303 and 421; Baracchini (1978), p. 85; Barrán and Nahum (1967), p. 
292; and (1973), pp. 446-449; Nahum and Barrán (1971), pp. 589-598; Martínez Díaz (1987), p. 75; 
Winn (2010), pp. 142 and 242. According to Nahum and Barrán (1971), Uruguayan railway rates were so 
high because they were adapted to both the characteristics of (transnational) transit trade and the features 
of livestock transport (seasonality and high value/volume ratio), and were not reduced when the former 
failed. Unlike the idea that is suggested in this paper, they affirm that those rates could have been 
decreased without loss for the companies, given the high level of net returns and the widespread presence 
of fraud in the companies’ accounts (p. 595). 
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Figure 5. Freight and rates in the Uruguayan and Argentinean railway companies 
in 1912-13 
 
Sources and notes: See Table 8. The Uruguayan companies are identified by an U. 
 
 
The application of high rates and an inelastic transport demand (ε < 1) explains 
that the average operating ratio of the Uruguayan companies was not worse than that of 
the companies of the neighbouring country. By 1912-13, the working expenses of the 
Uruguayan railway companies represented 57 percent of their gross revenues, a ratio 
that compared rather well with the equivalent Argentinean figure (62 percent in 1913). 
In addition, despite net revenues per km of line being significantly lower in Uruguay 
than in Argentina (245 vs. 317 pounds), economies in capital costs allowed the 
Uruguayan companies to get similar returns on capital as the Argentinean ones. More 
concretely, net revenues accounted for 4.04 percent of the total capital account of 
railways in Uruguay in 1912-13, compared to 3.97 percent in Argentina in 1913; and 
the average dividend distributed to ordinary shares by the Central Uruguay Railway 
between 1878 and 1914 was around 5 percent, if the worse years of the 1890 crisis are 
excluded (see Martínez Díaz, 1987: 80, and Barrán and Nahum, 1978: 145).28 However, 
                                                 
28
 The reported capital costs of the Uruguayan railways were 6,007 pounds per km, vs. 8,133 in 
Argentina. The Uruguayan figure was similar to that of those European countries with lower railway 
construction costs, such as Finland, Norway, Sweden or Bulgaria; see Herranz-Loncán (2008). Actually, 
according to Barrán and Nahum (1978), p. 149, real construction costs were much lower than reported 
ones. 
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this was only possible at the expense of cheap construction, shortage of rolling stock 
and a rather expensive and low quality transport service.29 
Therefore, the main explanatory factor for the low level of the resource saving 
effects of the railways was probably the small amount of freight transported by the 
railway system, which affected the social savings both directly and through its impact 
on the level of railway rates.30 If railway freight is expressed in relation to the country’s 
population, by 1913 railways were moving 263 ton-km per capita in Uruguay, whereas 
in Argentina they were transporting 1,201 ton-km per inhabitant, i.e. more than 4.5 
times the Uruguayan figure. But, why was railway freight so low in Uruguay compared 
with Argentina? Here I suggest three complementary explanations: the geographic 
distribution of population and activity in each country, the sectoral structure of GDP 
and the scale of each economy. 
Firstly, the distribution of population over the Uruguayan territory was clearly 
detrimental for railway transport. According to the 1908 Population Census, 30 percent 
of the country’s inhabitants lived in the capital city, against just 14 percent in the case of 
Argentina. This crucially reduced the potential utility of the railways as suppliers of the 
Uruguayan population’s general consumption needs. But, most importantly, 67 percent 
of Uruguayans lived in departments with a port or with easy access to river navigation. 
By contrast, this only happened with 28 percent of the Argentinean population, or 35 
percent if the departments bordering the coastal ones are included in the calculation.31 
Due to this difference, the Uruguayan economy depended much more heavily on water 
transport than its neighbour. By 1870, the rivers carried a very large proportion of the 
                                                 
29
 See e.g. Barrán and Nahum (1978), pp. 150-158, or Winn (2010), p. 252. Cheapness of construction 
was reflected in the lack of bridges and tunnels, and the circuitousness of the routes, and made transport 
costly, slow and low quality; criticisms on the bad quality on railway transport services were constant at 
the time. On this issue see e.g. Martínez Díaz (1987), p. 75; Millot and Bertino (1996), p. 345; or 
Acevedo (1934), pp. 564-55. 
30
 See a somehow similar interpretation in Barrán and Nahum (1973), p. 436. The high level of the 
railway rates had also an augmenting effect on the social savings through the increase in the value of 
railway output. However, that effect was compensated by the decreasing effect of the reduction in the 
difference between railway and alternative transport prices. This reinforces the idea that the really 
relevant factor to account for the low level of the social saving was the size of the railway sector. 
31
 Data on the population of coastal areas have been taken, in the case of Uruguay, from the country’s 
statistical yearbooks, and, in the case of Argentina, from Randle (1981). For Uruguay, I have included the 
population of Montevideo, Canelones, Colonia, Maldonado, Paysandú, Río Negro, Rocha, Salto, San José 
and Soriano. For Argentina, I have taken into account all coastal or river departments of the provinces of 
Misiones, Santa Fe, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Buenos Aires, Río Negro and Chubut, as well as the whole 
population of Formosa and Chaco. The second percentage for Argentina reported in the text considers 
both the coastal and river departments and the neighbouring ones, and it includes 48 percent of the 
population of Misiones, 71 percent of Corrientes, 91 percent of Santa Fe, 100 percent of Entre Ríos, 43 
percent of Buenos Aires, 26 percent of Río Negro and 71 percent of Chubut, as well as the federal capital. 
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total freight transport of the country, and their prominence did not disappear with the 
construction of the railway network.32 For instance, whereas the Argentinean GDP was 
7.7 times as large as the Uruguayan one by 1910, in the case of the total weight of 
loaded ships entered in ports for domestic trade purposes, the ratio between both 
countries was just around 4.4.33  
Secondly, the relative specialisation of the Uruguayan economy in extensive 
livestock production was clearly harmful for the growth of railway traffic density, due 
to the large land area that was required to produce each unit of output and the absence 
of return traffic (Barrán and Nahum, 1978, p. 172).34 In addition, those areas of 
Uruguay that were farther away from the ports were relatively more specialised in 
livestock, whereas agricultural areas, such as those west from Montevideo, enjoyed 
relatively easy access to water transport. By 1908/1913, for instance, the departments 
without access to the Uruguay River or La Plata estuary contained 58 percent of the 
Republic’s livestock, but only 27 percent of the hectares devoted to cereal production.35 
The situation was very different in Argentina, where those areas served by the railways 
in the inner parts of the country rapidly shifted into agriculture, thereby generating 
considerable flows of freight towards the ports and the urban markets (Cortés Conde, 
1979). Table 9 compares the composition of railway freight transport in both countries 
and shows that the activity of Uruguayan railways was highly concentrated on three 
kinds of goods: building materials of very low value per ton (especially stone and sand, 
which were mainly transported by the Uruguayo del Este railway), live animals, and the 
so-called “frutos del país” (mainly animal products, such as wool or hides). Those three 
items accounted for 58 percent of the total tons carried in 1912-13. By contrast, in 
Argentina the products of agriculture (especially wheat and corn) and also agro-industry 
(such as sugar, wine or salt), accounted for 42 percent of the freight moved by the 
Argentinean railways. 
                                                 
32
 According to Millot and Bertino (1996), p. 315, 40 percent of wool was transported to Montevideo by 
river in 1869 and, still in 1900, 15 to 20 percent of wheat received in the city came also by water. 
Similarly, Martínez Montero (1955, p. 397) indicates that, before the railways, 70 percent of the meat 
entered in Montevideo from the rest of Uruguay and Southern Brazil to be exported arrived there by river. 
33
 GDP comes from Maddison’s database, and data on the weight of loaded boats for domestic trade in 
each country comes from the respective statistical yearbooks; in the case of Uruguay, I have taken the 
average of the data for 1909 and 1911. 
34
 By 1912, livestock production accounted for 39 percent of Uruguayan GDP vs. 15 percent in 
Argentina; see Cortés Conde (1994) and Bértola (1998). 
35
 Figures calculated on the basis of the 1908 Livestock Census and the 1913-14 Statistical Yearbook. 
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Table 9. The composition of railway freight transport in Uruguay and Argentina in 
1912-13 (%). 
 Uruguay Argentina 
“Country products” (Frutos del país: 
wool, hides, bran, bones and horns, 
etc.) 
15.33 4.22 
Cereals and other agricultural products 11.21 32.93 
Industrial products 0 9.41 
Building materials  26.82 12.01 
General merchandise 19.74 18.24 
Animals 15.56 10.06 
Railway companies’ goods and 
materials 7.26 10.82 
Coal 4.08 2.31 
TOTAL 100 100 
Sources: for Uruguay, the Statistical Yearbook of 1913-14; for Argentina, Estadística de los 
Ferrocarriles en Explotación (1913). 
 
 
Finally, in Uruguay the railways had to face the problem of the small scale of the 
country. The Uruguayan railway network had a similar structure to the Argentinean one, 
as a series of lines departing from the capital city-port and spreading through the 
countryside. However, compared with Argentina, the potential maximum travel 
distances were much smaller. This affected railway output in two ways. On the one 
hand, journeys between production areas and the main port of the country were shorter, 
which directly translated into a lower amount of ton-km of railway freight. On the other 
hand, the share of freight transport that was short-distance, and in which carts or 
droving could still compete with the railways, was much higher in Uruguay than in 
Argentina. As a consequence, in Uruguay competition between carts and railways 
remained very intense at least until the end of the 19th century, because the sum of 
railway rates and transhipping costs made road transport competitive on many routes.36 
As a result of cart competition on short distances and the easy access to river 
navigation, the percentage of total freight transport carried by the Uruguayan railways 
was comparatively small (see e.g. Winn, 2010, p. 142). 
This helps to explain the key role that international transit trade had in 19th 
century Uruguayan railway planning, and the insistence that Montevideo should become 
                                                 
36
 This was one of the main worries of the managers of the Central Uruguay Railway, and was constantly 
reflected in their yearly reports. Already in the Report for 1875 (p. 13) and 1878 (p. 7), when a railway 
line longer than 200 km was already in operation, they complained about the absence of paths towards the 
stations, which forced carts to make considerable roundabouts to feed the railways and led many of them 
to go directly to Montevideo. This made their business to be “almost confined to passenger traffic” in 
those early years (see Central Uruguay Railway, Report of the Directors to the Shareholders with Report 
of the General Manager for the Half-year ended June, 1874, p. 4). By 1877, only freight traffic beyond 
Santa Lucía (59 km from Montevideo) was conveyed by the railways (see Central Uruguay Railway, 
Report and Accounts for the Year 1877, p. 4). 
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the node of a large intermodal network which would cover a large portion of the La 
Plata region, including Southern Brazil and parts of Paraguay and Argentina.37 If the 
Uruguayan railway network had been able to absorb a significant share of the export 
production of Southern Brazil, the size of the territory served by the railway network 
would have been much larger. Transit trade would have had a positive effect on railway 
rates even if it was “just circulation and not trade” (i.e. just transport from the 
neighbouring countries to the port of Montevideo without any involvement of 
Uruguayan agents; see Millot and Bertino, 1996: 317), due to the subsequent increase in 
the network density of use. However, this traffic was never very important, because of 
the delay in the development of Uruguayan railways in relation to the Argentinean ones, 
the slowness of the construction of both Uruguayan and Brazilian lines to the frontier, 
and the resistance of the Brazilian government to a closer relationship between its 
southern areas and Uruguay. Finally, transit trade prospects completely disappeared as 
soon as the new port in Brazil’s Rio Grande do Sul was finished in 1915.38 These 
factors confined the scope of the Uruguayan railways to the country’s territory, which 
was too small to generate enough traffic to make railways a significant growth factor. 
Obviously, if low freight caused high rates, these further discouraged output 
growth, and reduced the ability of the railways to compete with alternative transport 
modes, such as droving, water transport or even carts. As a result, the Uruguayan 
transport system was trapped in a vicious circle, in which railway rates were high 
because transport flows were small, but the growth of the latter was prevented, among 
other factors, by a structure of transport prices that substantially reduced the advantages 
of the railways. In addition, as was often stressed by contemporaries and historians, the 
negative effects of this problem were worse in the case of agricultural commodities, 
which had a lower value per unit of weight than livestock products. As a consequence, 
the high railway rates discouraged structural change in the country.39 All this conspired 
                                                 
37
 See, for instance, García Acevedo (1892), pp. 192-3; Nahum and Barrán (1971), pp. 543-548; Millot 
and Bertino (1996), p. 334; Rodríguez Carrasco (1998), p. 131; or Winn (2010), pp. 63-64. However, 
although transit trade was present in the global design of the railway system, there is no agreement in the 
historiography on the interest of the railway companies on this kind of trade, apart from the North 
Western of Uruguay Railway Company. Whereas Nahum and Barrán (1971) consider that it was their 
main objective, Martínez Díaz (1987) thinks that it was only of minor importance for the companies 
during most of the period under study. 
38
 Millot and Bertino (1996), p. 342. See also Costa (1902), or Winn (2010), p. 141. 
39
 See, for instance, García Acevedo (1892), p. 193; Nahum and Barrán (1971), pp. 591-592; or Barrán 
and Nahum (1978), pp. 138-140. According to these authors, the Uruguayan railway companies were 
rather indifferent to the consequences of their rate policy on the agricultural underdevelopment of the 
country, and the high level of their rates may be considered as the main reason for that sector lack of 
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to transform the Uruguayan railways into a relative failure, compared with the huge 
dynamism that the new transport infrastructure induced in countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico. In sum, during its export-led growth episode, Uruguay was 
particularly ill-adapted to benefit from one of the essential technologies that drove the 
first globalisation boom. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In some Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, the 
cost advantage of railways over traditional forms of transport during the first period of 
globalisation resulted in very large resource savings in freight transport, which was one 
of the bases on which those economies grew and developed during that time. Uruguay 
was among those Latin American countries that built a relatively dense railway 
network. However, unlike other economies in the region, the resource savings provided 
by Uruguayan railways were relatively small. Freight transport stayed at low levels and 
the cost advantage of railway rates over other forms of transport was not as high as in 
other countries. 
There are several potential explanations for the small size of the Uruguayan 
railway sector: cheap water transport was available on many routes, the specialisation of 
the country in livestock production did not generate much transport output per km2, and 
the small scale of the country increased the share of short distance journeys over total 
transport, thereby reducing the competitiveness of the railways over traditional forms of 
overland transport. In other words, the geography of the country did not provide an 
adequate context for achieving all the potential benefits of the new technology.  
                                                                                                                                               
dynamism. However, railway rates were not the only factor behind the low development of Uruguayan 
agriculture; for instance, Winn (2010), pp. 157-158, highlights the role played by the structure of land 
ownership, the system of rural credit and the conservatism of landowners. In addition, the companies 
repeatedly claimed that their future prospects crucially depended on the colonisation of the country and 
the growth of agricultural output. For instance the Report of the General Manager for the Half-year 
Ended June 30th, 1881 of the Central Uruguay Railway points out that: “Undoubtedly, the safest and most 
permanent source of traffic for our railway would be agricultural produce, and every effort should be 
made to promote immigration and colonization. With a population of small farmers on either side of the 
line traffic would be much heavier and more steady than it is at present” (p. 9); see similar statements in 
the Report for the Half-year Ended June 30th, 1879, p. 7; the Report for the year ended 31st December, 
1879, p. 11; the Report for the Half-Year Ended December 31st, 1884 p. 7; or the Report for the Year 
Ended June 30th, 1888, p. 9. According to Winn (2010), p. 157, all the four main railway companies 
promoted agricultural colonies during the period. 
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Uruguayan railways did produce some positive effects. They helped to integrate 
the national market while also promoting the political and administrative unification of 
the country (see Millot and Bertino, 1996, p. 328, or Barrán and Nahum, 1967, p. 294). 
But their economic impact was much lower than in other countries of the region that 
experienced export-led growth. This, indeed, may have affected the growth prospects of 
the Uruguayan economy, and should be taken into account when explaining its relative 
poor performance during the period under study. To sum up, the Uruguayan case 
provides a clear-cut case in which geography limited the potential of railway technology 
to generate significant levels of economic growth. 
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ANNEX 1 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL SAVING ESTIMATES 
The social saving estimations that have been presented in Section 3 may be 
biased due to the potential mistakes involved in certain assumptions on the 
counterfactual economy. Here I consider the potential effects of mistakes in three 
different areas: i) prices of carting transport; ii) the share of railway transport that would 
be replaced by river navigation in the event of a closure of the railway network; and iii) 
the assumption that there were no significant differences in Uruguay between the 
transport demand of the users of first and second class railway services. 
Regarding the first aspect, it might be argued that the carting rate that has been 
applied in the estimation is too low because most observations of carting transport 
prices come from sources aimed at criticising the high level of railway prices and, as a 
consequence, they might be downward biased. Here I consider the possibility that prices 
in the first six roads of Table 2 are downward biased and analyse the effect of using two 
different estimates of carting rates. On the one hand, I estimate a new rate of 0.067 
pesos per ton-km, on the basis of the observations of the two last roads of Table 2 and 
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the price reported by the Central Uruguay Railway in 1882.40 On the other hand, I apply 
the rate estimated by Summerhill (2000) for Argentina (equivalent to 0.0774 Uruguayan 
pesos per ton-km). The outcomes of those exercises are an increase in the (uncorrected) 
social saving of freight transport from 3.82 percent of GDP to 4.42 and 5.00 percent, 
respectively.41 
Secondly, I assume that the share of the railway transport that might be replaced 
by river navigation in the event of a closure of the railway network was 50 (150) percent 
of the share assumed in Table 3. This change would produce an (uncorrected) freight 
social saving of 4.31 (3.34) percent of GDP, instead of 3.82. Finally, if I abandon the 
assumption that there were no social differences between first and second class 
passengers and apply instead an estimation strategy similar to that used by Coatsworth 
(1981) and Summerhill (2003) for Brazil and Mexico, the (uncorrected) social savings 
of passenger transport would decrease from 1.92 to 1.26 percent of GDP.42 
These sensitivity analyses would indicate that biases associated to the 
assumptions introduced in the estimation might be not serious enough as to invalidate 
the general conclusion that the Uruguayan social savings were significantly lower than 
in other countries of the region. Actually, on the basis of these exercises, the maximum 
ratio between the (uncorrected) social saving and GDP would be 5.69 percent in the 
case of freight and 2.17 percent in the case of passengers.43 Correcting by the elasticity 
of demand, these estimates would become 2.79 and 1.02 respectively. It is true that 
these figures exclude a large share of the indirect cost savings provided by the railways. 
However, those benefits are also absent from other countries’ estimates, and it is rather 
doubtful that they could affect the general impression of a railway system with a 
comparatively low impact in terms of resource savings. 
 
                                                 
40
 It could be argued, however, that the rates reported in the last two rows of Table 2 are affected by the 
opposite problem from the rest: they come from documents aimed at criticising the high level of road 
transport rates. 
41
 These figures and the following are based on the assumption of a zero demand elasticity, as the 
estimates in Table 3 and 4. 
42
 This correction means that: i) the time savings of second class passenger are valued at half the price of 
those of the first class; ii) in the case of the second class, the alternative to the railways in overland 
transport was walking. 
43
 This is the result of assuming: i) the maximum carting rate (0.0774) for freight, and ii) the minimum 
share (50 percent of the original estimate) for water transport, both for freight and passengers. 
